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REFORMULATING THE STRUCTURE
OF ESTATES:

A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Lawrence W. Waggoner *
Professor Waggoner points out various major inadequacies of
the present structure of estates and traces them to the distinctions

between conditions and limitations, between conditions precedent

and conditions subsequent, and between reversionary and nonrever-

sionary interests. Eschewing such distinctions as artificial, he presents a reformulated structure of possessory and future interests
and urges its enactment into law.

I. THE CASE FOR REFORMULATION

T HE structure of estates, which was developed over a period
of about seven centuries, was and is a great achievement.
Although certain parts are adaptable to commercial transfers of

property, the peculiar strength of the structure is that it makes

available a range of flexibility in the gratuitous transmission of

family wealth that is unmatched in non-common law countries.
At its heart is the abstract concept that present ownership is

capable of being fragmented in terms of time and in terms of
beneficial enjoyment. Both types of fragmentation are fundamental to the trust, a central device in modern estate planning.'
The present structure of estates is shown in the accompanying

chart. Magnificent though the structure is, it is unsatisfactory
for a number of reasons. The first is its extraordinary complexity,
which has proved a barrier to comprehension. Some lawyers and

judges who took the course covering future interests in law school
do not fully understand the subject matter, and few who did not

*Professor of Law, University of Illinois; Visiting Professor of Law, North-

western University. B.B.A., University of Cincinnati, I960; J.D., University of
Michigan, I963; D. Phil., Oxford University, I966.
The author wishes to thank his temporary colleague, Daniel M. Schuyler, for
his careful review of this manuscript and for his many valuable suggestions.

1 In the latter half of I970, the aggregate market value of personal trust assets
under administration by insured commercial banks was over $IO8.5 billion. BOARD
oF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FDIC & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TRUST ASSETS OF INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS-

1970, at 5 (I97I).
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THE HIERARCHY OF ESTATES 2

Possessory Interests Possible Combinations of Future Interests

Nonreversionary (in Reversionary (in the

transferees) transferor or his
successor)

Fee Simple Absolute None permissible None permissible
Defeasible Fee Simple:

Fee Simple When none created Possibility of Reverter
Determinable 3 Executory Interest If any, Possibility of
Reverter

Fee Simple Subject to a When none created Right of Entry (Power
Condition

of

Termination)

Subsequent 4 Executory Interest If any, Right of Entry
Fee Tail 5 . ., Same as with Life Estate . . .

Life Estate When no remainder Indefeasibly Vested
created Reversion

Contingent Remainder Reversion Vested Subject

(subject to a condition to Defeasance (may be

precedent); Alternative merely technical)
Contingent Remainders
Remainder Vested If any, Reversion
Subject to Defeasance Vested Subject to

(conditional); Defeasance
Executory Interest

Remainder Vested If any, Reversion either
Subject to Defeasance Vested Subject to
(limitational); Defeasance or
Remainder Indefeasibly Vested
Remainder Vested None permissible
Subject to Open;
Executory Interest (in

unborn class members)

Indefeasibly Vested None permissible
Remainder

Life Estate Subject to a Same as with Life Estate Reversion and

Special Limitation Possibility of
Reverter 6 (otherwise,
same as with Life
Estate)

Life Estate Subject to a Remainder and Reversion and Right of
Condition Subsequent Executory Interest Entry (otherwise,
(otherwise, same as same as with Life
with Life Estate) Estate)

Term of Years . . . Same as with Life Estate . . .
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take the course have mastered it in practice.7 This complexity is
unnecessary, for the abstract concept of fragmentation of ownership does not require such elaborateness; the same degree of
flexibility in the gratuitous transmission of family wealth as well
as in the commercial transfer of property can be sustained under
a vastly simplified system.
Another defect of the present structure is that a considerable

proportion of the artificiality with which the law of future in2 Although the chart is believed to be substantially accurate and complete,
it does not purport to depict all the combinations of future interests that possibly

could follow each possessory interest. A remainder following a life estate might,
for example, be in fee simple determinable, in which case the transferor might retain a possibility of reverter in addition to, or instead of, a reversion. Nor does
the chart take special note of the fact that the holder of a fee simple absolute can
create a springing executory interest in a transferee to take effect in possession at

some designated future time. This would render the possessory interest defeasible,
but the most commonly used name for this possessory interest - fee simple sub-

ject to an executory limitation - does not appear on the chart because it is believed to be adequately covered by the broader term, defeasible fee simple.

3 Fee simple determinable is the most common name employed to describe this

interest. Other names are base fee, qualified fee, and fee simple on a special limitation. The Restatement of Property utilizes the name fee simple determinable,

but along with some other authorities, limits its usage to instances in which the
interest is followed by a possibility of reverter. If followed by an executory interest, the Restatement calls the possessory interest a "fee simple with an executory
limitation creating an interest which takes effect at the expiration of a prior in-

terest." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 47 (I936). The other authorities which

adhere to this distinction usually call it simply a fee simple subject to an executory
.limitation. See, e.g., C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
37 (I962). The distinction is not followed in the American Law of Property. I

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 4.55 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. But see id. ? 2.IO.

4 The Restatement of Property and some other authorities differentiate between
instances in which this interest is followed by a right of entry (power of termina-

tion) and those in which it is followed by an executory interest, calling the latter
a "fee simple subject to an executory limitation." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ?
46 (1936); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 3, at 37.

' The fee tail interest, though still permissible in a handful of states, has faded

from importance. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ?11f I96-98 (recomp. ed. P. Rohan
I967) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
6 It is disputed whether the possibility of reverter is merged in the reversion.
Compare W. SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING ? 2.32 n.i (i965)

[hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ], with T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO

ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 65 (I966) [hereinafter cited as BERGIN
& HASKELL].

I See A. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
6-7 (1959); T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS

230 (1972) ("I have never met a practicing lawyer who thought he understood
future interests, and the best that the best of law students will say is that he

understands it sometimes."). Sands v. Fly, 200 Tenn. 414, 292 S.W.2d 706 (I956),
is a particularly striking example of the many decisions in which courts have dis-

played an imperfect understanding of the area.
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terests is riddled is directly attributable to the structure of estates
itself. The general misunderstanding of the subject matter is due
not only to the intricacy of the law, but also to the fact that the
law frequently makes very little sense. Decisions often turn on
the form in which a disposition is stated rather than on its substance. Different legal consequences flow from verbal differences

in referring to the same time, the same person, or the same event.8
This artificiality leads to a further flaw in the present structure: easy circumvention.9 While some lawyers do not fully comprehend the present system, many do. The knowledgeable can
use the artificiality of the system to the advantage of their clients.

Whenever legal consequences turn on differences of form, certain
results can be achieved by skillful wording of a disposition or by
other maneuvers without otherwise affecting the substance of the
transaction. Many rules of law in this area, therefore, serve only
to trap those unsophisticated in the available ways of manipulation.

Finally, out of the complexity and artificiality of the present
structure has arisen a phenomenon that may be called the classi-

ficatory mystique - the notion that classifying the interests created in a transfer solves most problems. The volumes are replete
with opinions which discuss at length the distinctions between
various types of interests. Often these opinions string together

definitions which were meaningless to begin with and are, to boot,
irrelevant to the case at hand; lost in verbal mazes, they never
come to grips with the real issues.10 This phenomenon goes beyond the familiar cases in which the question is whether a future
interest is subject to a condition of survivorship, but the discussion is over whether the interest is vested or contingent.1' Elmore
v. Austin 12 is illustrative. The testator devised a parcel of land
to his daughter, Lucy, providing that her interest should become
absolute if she erected a proper dwelling house on the land or if
she died leaving issue. He went on to say, however, that if she
failed to erect a house or if she died without leaving issue, her
interest should terminate on her death. Lucy had built a house
but was childless when she brought an action for a declaratory
judgment. The question, of course, was one of construction:
whether it was sufficient if only one of the conditions was fulfilled

8 McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, Io86 (1942).

' For a general discussion of avoidance, see H. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW
26-30 (I969).

10 See Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem
for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13, 54-55 (1958).

'" E.g., Gordon v. Feldman, 267 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 1971).
12 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950).

I972] RESTRUCTURING ESTATES 733

Nevertheless, a reading of the opinion leaves the distinct impres-

sion that the decision depended on whether Lucy received a fee
simple determinable or a life estate followed by a contingent re-

mainder. The court chose the former and apparently concluded
thereby that the erection of the house rendered her interest

absolute.

These deficiencies unnecessary complexity, artificiality,
easy circumvention, and classificatory mystique -surely make

the case for a reformulation of the present structure. Indeed,
under such circumstances a call for reformulation should not be
surprising. In fact, it is not new. The goal of the New York
reform legislation of I830 was reformulation, and in that sense

it was a significant step forward, despite the fact that many of

the innovations turned out badly because of poor drafting and
have since been repealed. Shortly after the first two volumes of

the Restatement of Property were published in 1936, Professor

Simes wrote of a belief that we were "on the eve of a movement
looking toward the improvement and simplification of the law
of Future Interests by legislation." 13 One of the accomplishments
of the Restatement was, ironically, thought to be "to state what
is a recognized principle of law in such clear and distinct form

that its bad nature may become apparent." 14 The development
anticipated by Professor Simes was the Uniform Estates Act,

which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in I938.15 Unfortunately, the Uniform
Estates Act turned out to be merely a codification of the structure
set forth in the Restatement, and it has been accorded a certain
degree of oblivion. It has yet to be adopted in any state; and
although the Commissioners do recommend it for consideration in
states having need for legislation in this area, 16 they no longer
promote it for uniform enactment.

Indeed, in spite of the glaring deficiencies in the present structure, and perhaps because of the unsatisfactory New York ex-

perience, progress toward statutory reformulation has been practically imperceptible. Only three states currently have legislation
which can properly be regarded as simplifying and improving the
common law structure in any significant sense. Remainders and
executory interests are assimilated under the name remainder in
13 Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARV. L. REV. 749, 783 (I937).
14 II ALI PROCEEDINGS 146 (1932-1934) (statement of George W. Wickersham,
President of the Institute).

15 1938 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
269.

16 1970 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
363.
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New York and Wisconsin;`7 and in Kentucky, language which
at common law would have created a fee simple determinable and

a possibility of reverter is construed as creating a fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition broken and a right of entry.18
Legislation in a few other states, based on the original New York
statute, appears at first glance to effect an assimilation of remainders with executory interests and of possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry with reversions; but a closer reading of these
statutes reveals that the distinctions are maintained.'9 A number
17 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW ?? 6-3.2, -4.3 (McKinney I967); WIS.
STAT. ANN. ? 700.04(2) (Supp. 1970).

18 Ky. REV. STAT. ? 38I.2I8 (I962). A subsequent section of the Kentucky
statute provides that a right of entry "may be created in a person other than the

person creating the interest or his heirs." Id. ? 38I.219. Since this provision does
not require that language which would at common law have created an executory
interest following a defeasible fee simple be construed as creating a right of entry,
its effect does not appear to be to assimilate executory interests and rights of entry.

But see R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 26 (I966).

19 These statutes provide that, except for reversions, all future interests in land
which are dependent on a precedent estate are to be labeled "remainders." But

they further provide that "remainders" which divest the precedent estate are
called "conditional limitations," which is another name for shifting executory
interests. Consequently, they cannot be regarded as eliminating the distinction

between remainders and executory interests. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ?? 33-204,
-227 (I956); CAL. CIV. CODE ?? 769, 778 (West 1954); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
ANN. ? 45-8II (I968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ?? 554.11, .27 (I967); MINN.
STAT. ? 500.II (I969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. ?? 67-5I0, -519 (1962); N.D.
CENT. CODE ?? 47-04-10, -04-19 (I960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6o, ?? 30, 40

(I97I); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. ?? 43-9-4, -9-10 (I967); see IDAHO CODE ?
55-205 (i957).
"Reversions" are defined in these statutes as the residue of an estate left in

the grantor or his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession

upon the determination of a "particular" estate granted or devised. This definition
would seem to be broad enough to assimilate under the name "reversion" the common law possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and reversions. However, the
possessory interest upon which this statutory "reversion" is dependent is called a

"particular" estate; and since a "particular" estate is a possessory interest other
than a fee simple, this statutory definition is actually in accord with, not broader
than, the common law definition of reversions. Many of these statutes also contain a provision to the effect that the only future interests recognized are those

defined in the statute. The effect of this provision alone could be thought to be
either to abolish possibilities of reverter and rights of entry or to relabel them
"remainders," but rights of entry are mentioned in other statutory provisions.
CAL. CIV. CODE ?? 703, 768, 790-93 (West 1954); GA. CODE ANN. ?? 85-70I,

-906 (1970); MINN. STAT. ?? 500.08, .og, .I6, .20 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. ?? 67-329, -509, -525 (I962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6o, ?? 29, 47, 48 (I97I);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. ?? 43-8-II, -8-I2, -9-3 (I967). Nevertheless, in Oklahoma

the statutory definitions of reversions and remainders were relied on in a series of
decisions proclaiming that there is no difference in alienability between rights of

entry and possibilities of reverter. Crowl v. Tidnam, I98 Okla. 650, 653, i8i

P.2d 549, 552 (i947); Fuhr v. Oklahoma City, 194 Okla. 482, 485, 153 P.2d uS5,
II8 (i944); Kassner v. Alexander Drug Co., 194 Okla. 36, 39, 147 P.2d 979, 982
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of these same states, it should be noted, still have derivatives
of the original New York statutory definitions of contingent and
vested future interests,20 even though these definitions caused so
much confusion in New York that they finally were replaced with
ones which accord with the common law.2'
II. SOURCES OF THE DEFICIENCIES
IN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE

Before a specific proposal for the restructuring of estates can

be advanced, the sources of the deficiencies in the present structure need to be identified and explored in some detail. An effort
has been made, however, to make this discussion as brief as possible by omitting anything more than passing references to historical developments. A page of history may be worth a volume
of logic in understanding property law, but not in justifying it.
The law in this area, as in any other, must be evaluated for what
it is, not on how it came to be that way.
The present deficiencies are all related and are all traceable
to three cherished distinctions: the distinctions between conditions and limitations, between conditions precedent and conditions
subsequent, and between interests either left or created in the
transferor and those created in a transferee. Complicating these
three distinctions is the frequent categorization of interests not
by analysis of their own nature, but by reference to the classification of the interest that precedes them either in form (the sequence in which the interests are stated) or in substance (the
sequence of possession).
A. The Concept of Defeasance:

Condition and Limitation

i. Classification of Interests Subject to Defeasance. - Under
the present structure, the only interests which are indefeasible
(i944). These decisions are discussed in Browder, Defeasible Fee Estates in Okla-

homa, 4 OKLA. L. REV. I4V, I57-66 (195I). But a later Oklahoma decision on
the issue of the use of property referred to the common law distinctions. Frensley

v. White, 208 Okla. 209, 254 P.2d 982 (I953), discussed in Browder, Defeasible
Fee Estates in Oklahoma-An Addendum, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 482 (1953). In the
other states, these statutory provisions have not affected the common law distinctions among possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and reversions. See, e.g., Alamo

School Dist. v. Jones, i82 Cal. App. 2d i8o, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (I960).
20 AiA. CODE tit. 47, ? I40 (I958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ? 33-205 (1956);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. ? 45-8I2 (I968); GA. CODE ANN. ? 85-703 (1970);

IDAHO CODE ?? 55-1O5, -io6 (I957); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ? 554.13 (I967);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. ?? 67-320, -321 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE ? 47-02-I5
(i960); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. ?? 43-3-10, -3-II (I967).

21 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW ?? 6-4.7 to -4.10 (McKinney I967).
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are in fee simple absolute. This category includes future interests
as well as possessory interests; future interests are indefeasibly
vested only if certain to become possessory and certain to be in
fee simple absolute once they become possessory.22 Although this
distinction has substance, the present structure does not stop with
differentiating interests which are indefeasible from those which
are not. The concept of defeasance is divided artificially into two
categories: condition and limitation. Both possessory and future
interests may be made defeasible on either a condition or a limitation. The classic "to A for as long as the premises are used
for residential purposes, and upon the cessation of such use, to B"
illustrates a possessory interest subject to a limitation. Since
A's interest is a fee simple, it is classified as a fee simple determinable; if it had been a life estate, it would have been called a
life estate on a special limitation (the word "special" differentiates
it from the ordinary life estate, which is itself an estate subject
to a limitation). "To A, but if the premises cease being used
for residential purposes, then to B," on the other hand, creates a
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent; if A's interest had
been for life, it would have been called a life estate subject to a
condition subsequent.
The familiar justification for this distinction is that the in-

terest subject to a limitation expires "naturally" by its own terms
if the event occurs, whereas the interest subject to a condition is
"cut short" or "divested" if the event occurs. But surely this
difference is simply verbal. In each instance the substance is the
same. Both interests are to terminate upon the happening of
the same uncertain event: the premises' ceasing to be used for
residential purposes. To conclude otherwise is to deny that "to
A, but if the premises cease being used for residential purposes,
then to B" is just a shorthand way of saying "to A, but if the
premises cease being used for residential purposes, A's interest is

to terminate and the property is to go to B." Yet important
legal consequences flow from treating conditions and limitations
as different things, instead of as different ways of saying the same
thing.23
22 2 POWELL 11T 275, 277; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 157, comments f, p,
illustration 15, at 546-47, 554-56 (1936).

23 The notion that conditions and limitations carry different meanings
beyond the concept that a limitational interest expires "naturally" and a conditional one expires by being "cut short." For example, it is widely, though not
universally, held that a provision for the termination of an interest on marriage
is valid if stated in limitational form, but illegal if in the form of a condition.
The explanation is fantastic. A limitation, it is said, imports an intention to provide support until marriage, whereas a condition indicates a restraint on marriage.
See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 27.I4.
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2. Failure of Succeeding Interests. - The condition-limitation

distinction now has importance when the succeeding interest fails
and no supplanting interest has been stated by the transferor.
A succeeding interest can fail, of course, for any of a variety of
reasons. For example, B's interest in the preceding examples

violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.24 When an interest subject to a limitation is followed by an interest which fails, it is
automatically assumed that the prior interest nevertheless termi-

nates if the event described in the limitation occurs.- But the
opposite conclusion is often mechanically reached when it is an
interest subject to a condition that is followed by a failing in-

terest.26 The condition subsequent is not really part of the preceding interest, the rationale goes, but rather is a condition
precedent attached to the succeeding interest, and when the suc-

ceeding interest fails the condition drops out with it. The wood-

enness of this approach is obvious.
The Restatement of Property, relying principally on a group

of English decisions, established a modification of these rules by

saying that the prior interest should not become indefeasible
automatically. Rather, there should only be a constructional
preference for indefeasibility, stronger when the gift over fails

because it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, but rebuttable
if the transferor "affirmatively manifests" an intent that the prior
interest terminate whether or not the succeeding interest can take
effect.27 According to the Restatement, a limitation but not a

24Other possible causes of failure include a legatee's predeceasing the testator
a legatee's surviving the creation of the interest but dying before the occurrence

of the uncertain event on which the gift over is expressly conditioned, and so on.

25 First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, I55 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (I892); City
of Klamath Falls v. Bell, 490 P.2d 5I5 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971); 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY ? 2I.47; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 228, comment b, at 937-38

(I936). Agnor, A Tale of Two Cases, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1427, I429 (I964), believes that the First Universalist decision was decided on the basis of an incorrect
reading of Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray)

142 (i855). The rule, nevertheless, seems to be well entrenched today. The only
exception arises when the succeeding interest is a possibility of reverter which is
invalid, for example, because of a statute which limits the validity of possibilities
of reverter to a certain number of years. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, ? 37e

(I969). Since there is no other place for the property to go, the limited estate
becomes absolute. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 228, comment d, at 939-40 (I936).

26 See McGothlin v. McElvain, 407 Ill. 142, 153, 95 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1950);
Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142, 156-

62 (i855); Edward John Noble Hosp. v. Board of Foreign Missions, i3 Misc. 2d
9I8, 176 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. I958); Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, I9 A.2d

82 (i94i); Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Allen, 22i Tenn. 90, 98-iOO, 424
S.W.2d 796, 8oo-oi (I967); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 24.47, at 124.

27 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 229, comments d, e, at 949-50 (193
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condition affirmatively manifests by itself such an intent.28 This
modification has been attacked on the ground that it introduces
uncertainty into the law, whereas the automatic rules were per-

fectly satisfactory and doctrinally sound.29 What such criticism
overlooks is that the chief source of uncertainty is the conditionlimitation distinction itself. It is often unclear whether the lan-

guage of any given disposition is conditional or limitational.30
Thus the Restatement, admirable though its purposes may have
been in shifting the inquiry to why the succeeding interest failed,
perpetuated the source of uncertainty that pervades this area.31
3. Classification of Succeeding Interests. - Since conditions

and limitations are treated as different in substance, it follows,
we have seen, that an interest to which a condition is attached
must be classified differently from one to which a limitation is

attached. It is thought to follow further that the interests which
succeed them must also be classified differently. This distinction,
coupled with the distinction between interests left or created in

the transferor and those created in a transferee, results in a complex maze. Conditional interests are followed by executory in-

terests, created in a transferee, and rights of entry, created in
the transferor. Since conditional interests are said to terminate
by being "cut short" or "divested," these two future interests
take effect by "cutting short" or "divesting" the preceding interest. Limitational interests, on the other hand, are followed by
remainders, created in a transferee, and possibilities of reverter
and reversions, left in the transferor - all of which are said to
take effect on the "natural" termination of the preceding interest.
Reversions follow only life estates or terms of years, whereas
possibilities of reverter follow interests in fee simple determinable and life estates or terms of years subject to a special limitation. There are even more complications, for if the interest subject
to a limitation is a fee simple determinable and the future interest
following it is created in a transferee, the future interest is not a
remainder - even though in the artificial world of estates it operates like a remainder - because there is a rule that a remainder
cannot follow a fee interest. If not a remainder, what is it? It
is an executory interest because it cannot be anything else.
At this point, however, it seems best not to pursue the cateMonograph, Ineffectiveness of an Ultimate Executory Interest, in 2 RESTATEMENT

OF PROPERTY App. 34 (I936). See also 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 2I.48.
28 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 228, comment b, at 937-38 (1936); id. ? 229,
comment e, at 949-50.

29 Bordwell, Book Review, 5I HARV. L. REV. 565, 570 (1938).
30E.g., In re Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (I960).

31 See Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination -Fraternal
or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CmI. L. REV. 215, 223-24 (I953).
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gorization attributable to the distinction between future interests

created in a transferee and those left or created in the transferor;
that will be discussed later. The focus here is on the categorization of future interests caused by the distinction between conditions and limitations: remainders versus executory interests, and
possibilities of reverter (and reversions) versus rights of entry.

(a) Remainders versus Executory Interests. - When a remainder and an executory interest both in form and substance

follow a possessory interest, both interests come into possession
upon the happening of the event which terminates the prior possessory interest. The notion that a remainder takes effect on the
"natural" termination of a limitational interest and that an
executory interest takes effect by "cutting short" a conditional
interest involves merely a verbal distinction. Moreover, as in-

dicated, the distinction is not always adhered to. A fee simple
determinable is followed by an executory interest, not a remainder.
The distinction between a remainder and an executory interest

is equally artificial when they follow a future interest in the sequence in which the interests are stated, for the substance of

such situations is that the succeeding interests follow possessory
interests as alternatives to the future interest that precedes them
in form. Under the present structure, "to A for life, then to B

if he survives A, otherwise to C," creates a remainder in C. "To
A for life, then to B, but if B fails to survive A, then to C" gives
C an executory interest. The operation of C's interest in each
disposition is the same. If B does not survive A, C takes. The
difference depends solely on the arrangement of the words. Since
A's interest in each disposition is a life estate (an interest subject
to a limitation), B's interest in each case is a remainder. C's
interest, however, is different. In the first example it is treated

as if it, too, follows A's life estate: B does not have a vested
interest, and thus C can become entitled to possession without
first divesting B's interest. In the second example, however, C's
interest is not initially treated as if it directly follows A's interest;

it is treated as if it follows B's vested interest, which is subject
not to a limitation but rather to a condition. If B does not sur-

vive A, C takes on the "natural" termination of A's interest, but
this occurs only after C's executory interest has been transformed
into an indefeasibly vested remainder - that is, after B's interest
has been "cut short" by his death during A's lifetime.
Not only is the distinction between remainders and executory
interests artificial, it is unnecessary. The only legal consequences
which now turn on the distinction are the destructibility rule in
the case of contingent remainders and perhaps, when the two
interests are created in the heirs of a life tenant, the Rule in
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Shelley's Case.32 Both of these rules are of negligible importance,
having been abolished in the vast majority of states.33 Yet the
interests continue to have separate identities under the present
structure, a situation which contributes substantially to the

classificatory mystique.
(b) Possibilities of Reverter (and Reversions) versus Rights
of Entry. - Possibilities of reverter and reversions follow limita-

tional interests; rights of entry follow conditional interests. Possibilities of reverter are distinguished from reversions on two
grounds. First, possibilities of reverter are usually regarded as
contingent, while reversions are regarded as vested. Secondly,

the limitational interests which reversions follow are life estates
and terms of years; the limitational interests which possibilities
of reverter follow are fees simple determinable and those life
estates and terms of years subject to a special limitation. Be-

cause rights of entry are contingent and follow fees simple, life
estates, and terms of years subject to a condition subsequent, the
possibility of reverter is more comparable to the right of entry

than is the reversion, and the succeeding discussion therefore
does not directly consider reversions.

The justification usually offered for separating possibilities
of reverter from rights of entry goes beyond inquiry into the interests preceding them. By tradition, the breach of the condition
preceding a right of entry has a consequence different from a

breach of the condition preceding an executory interest. This difference derives from the difference in the language creating the
two interests: instead of "to A, but if the premises cease being

used for residential purposes, the premises to return to the trans-

feror," the classical right of entry language is "to A, but if the
premises cease being used for residential purposes, the transferor

is to have the right to reenter and take possession of the premises." The standard appraisal is that the difference between rights

of entry and possibilities of reverter is analogous to that between
rights of entry and executory interests: the interests operate

differently. In one case, the occurrence of the event terminates

32 Dukeminier, supra note io, at 20-23, 31-41.
" L. SIMES & A. SMITH, TiHE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS ?? 207-09, I563-69
(2d ed. I956) [hereinafter cited as SIMES & SMITH]. Moreover, because of their

feudal origins, the destructibility rule and the Rule in Shelley's Case generally
apply only to interests in real property. In North Carolina, however, Shelley's

Rule is applicable to personal property. Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 143

S.E.2d 65 (1965). To avoid risking an action for defamation, Professor Leach
refused to comment on the Riegel decision. W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED!
54 n.6o (1967).
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A's interest; in the other, it only gives the transferor the power
to terminate A's interest if he so desires.

This standard appraisal must be qualified by two observations.
First, the substantive difference between rights of entry and pos-

sibilities of reverter sometimes does arise artificially from the
condition-limitation distinction. When the transferor's interest
is not expressly stated, it is held to be a right of entry rather than
a possibility of reverter if the possessory interest is clearly one

that is stibject to a condition subsequent.34 The language of con-

dition is in effect treated as somehow importing merely the power
to terminate upon the happening of the specified event,35 rather
than the automatic right to possession that clear limitational
language standing alone imports.36 Moreover, the notion that
clear language of condition subsequent imports merely a right of
entry is so strong that it has sometimes been held to apply even

when the transferor's interest is expressly described in possibility
of reverter terms.37 In situations such as these, therefore, the
substantive difference between a possibility of reverter and a right

of entry can be dismissed as analogous to other consequences
which flow straight from the artificial condition-limitation distinction. In short, the standard appraisal stands up only when the

future interests are expressly created in classical terms.
This leads to the second observation. Even when expressly

created, the substantive difference is not conceptually required;
it is merely customary. There is no reason a possibility of reverter
could not be created which would entitle the transferor to possession upon the happening of the specified event plus his election
to terminate the precedent interest. The language "to A for as
long as the premises are used for residential purposes, and upon

the cessation of such use for as long thereafter as the transferor
refrains from reentering and taking possession; upon the transferor's reentering and taking possession after the premises have
34E.g., Hughes v. Cook, I26 Ind. App. io3, IIO, 130 N.E.2d 330, 334 (I955).
35 I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 2.6, at 96-97. This is often explained differently, on the ground that the law "abhors a forfeiture." When the choice is

between a possibility of reverter and a right of entry, the latter is chosen because
it is more favorable to the holder of the possessory interest. In a similar vein,
language which is not clearly in conditional or limitational form is often inter-

preted variously as merely precatory or as creating a covenant, a trust, or an
equitable charge rather than either a right of entry or a possibility of reverter.
See id. ? 4.7; 2 POWELL 1T i88; SIMES & SMITH ? 248.

36 Bailey v. Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 202 Tenn. 195, 303 S.W.2d 726 (i957);
I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 4.I3. Contra, In re Copps Chapel Methodist

Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, i66 N.E. 2i8 (1929).

37 Fausett v. Guisewhite, i6 App. Div. 2d 82, 225 N.Y.S.2d 6i6 (i962);
Wagner v. Wallowa County, 76 Ore. 453, I48 P. II40 (1915); Watters v. Bredin,
70 Pa. 235 (i872). See note 35 supra.
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ceased being used for residential purposes, the premises to revert
to the transferor" brings the substance of this possibility of reverter into line with a right of entry.
It cannot be denied that, at least in theory, the classical lan-

guage describing possibilities of reverter and rights of entry does
not involve two ways of saying the same thing. It says different
things, and the standard appraisal does stand up in these circumstances. Yet, when examined closely, this "substantive" difference
turns out to be less meaningful than it appears, for the direction
of the law, both legislative and judicial, has been toward the
elimination of the differences rather than toward their preserva-

tion. Insofar as enforcement - the major point of supposed distinction - is concerned, there is little practical difference between
the two future interests. In most states the commencement of an
action to regain possession satisfies the requirement of an election
to terminate the possessory interest, and the holder of a possibility of reverter usually must institute a similar action in order
to enforce his "automatic" interest.38 In addition, after the specified event has occurred, the time allowable under the law of many
states for bringing an action to enforce a possibility of reverter
is the same as that for making an election under a right of entry.39
The statute of limitations in several states explicitly begins running upon the occurrence of the specified event against both a
possibility of reverter and a right of entry;40 in other states the
statute has been so interpreted;4' and in still others, the statute
is open to such an interpretation.42 The two interests are thus
brought into line with one another on the question of adverse
possession.43 Finally, although the statute of limitations in some
states is held not to begin running until an election under a right
of entry has been effected, the courts, in an analogy to the equitable doctrine of laches, have required that an election be made
within a "reasonable time" after the breach of the condition;

and there is authority that the period of the statute of limitations
constitutes a "reasonable time." 44 Other matters of supposed
38 Dunham, supra note 3 1, at 2I6.
39 Id. at 229-30; Comment, Equivalence of Right of Entry and Right of
Reverter, i8 OHIO ST. L.J. 120, 123-26 (1957).

40 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, ?? ia, ib (I969); VA. CODE ANN. ? 8-5
( I95 7) .

41 See, e.g., Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, I23 P.2d 4I2 (I942), construing

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ? II8-8-4 (I963).

42 Comment, supra note 39, at I24 & n.27.
43 Dunham, supra note 3i, at 229.

44 Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 2i6 Ark. 657, 226 S.W.2d 8io

(1950); see Note, Is a Right of Re-Entry Barred by Passage of Time?, 13 U. PITT
L. REV. 7i6, 72I-22 (1952). Decisions concerning what constitutes a "reasonable
time" are collected in SIMES & SMITH ? 258, at 324 n.5.
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difference between the two interests also turn out to be insub-

stantial upon close examination.45
B. The Concept of Vesting: Condition Precedent and

Defeasance (Condition Subsequent or Limitation)
The only defeasible interests that can exist under the present
structure are those labeled "vested." Possessory interests are of

course always vested; and, as noted, they can be made defeasible
in either of two senses: they can be subject to a condition or to a

limitation. Future interests, if vested, can also be made defeasible
in either of the two senses. An example of a vested future interest

defeasible in the limitational sense is a remainder for life. A
future interest defeasible in the conditional sense is classified more
narrowly as vested subject to divestment. Conditions of divest-

ment, called conditions subsequent, are distinguished under the
present structure from conditions precedent; future interests that

are subject to conditions precedent are labeled "contingent"
rather than defeasible. The difference, therefore, between future
interests that are contingent and those that are vested subject to

defeasance is that the former are subject to a condition precedent
and the latter are subject either to a condition subsequent or to
a limitation.
It was not always this clear. The concept of vesting histori-

cally was tied to the idea of seisin, and the definition of vested
and contingent future interests remained uncertain as late as the

earlier part of this century.46 One of the few reforms attempted
by the Restatement of Property was to fix the concept of vesting
in terms of the condition precedent-condition subsequent or
limitation distinction.47 What is wrong with this concept is not
that it is ambiguous, but rather that it is patently artificial.
i. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests 48 versus
45 Such matters are explored in detail in Dunham, supra note 3I, at 2I8-33
(possession, use and enjoyment of the subject matter; power to alienate volun-

tarily; power to determine devolution at death; termination or loss of right;
availability of remedies); Comment, supra note 39, at 122-23, I26-27 (dower;
creditors' rights).

46Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH.
L. REV. 887, 888-926 (1958).

7 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 157 (1936).

" The type of executory interest under discussion in this section is the typical
executory interest which is contingent because it is subject to a condition precedent.

Excluded from the discussion are those atypical executory interests which are not
subject to any condition, precedent or subsequent. "To A for life, and one day

after A's death, to B," "to B forty years from date," and "to B upon my death"
are illustrations of the latter. Executory interests of this type are analogous to
indefeasibly vested remainders and should be treated accordingly even under the
present structure of estates. Dukeminier, supra note io, at 25-26, 5I-52.
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Remainders Vested Subject to Defeasance. - The artificiality is
most clear when the event upon which the condition depends must
precede or coincide with the termination of the prior possessory

interest. In the disposition "to A for life, then to B, but if B
fails to survive A, then to C," B's interest, since subject to a
condition subsequent, is a vested remainder subject to divestment.
"To A for life, then to B if he survives A; otherwise to C," how-

ever, gives B a contingent remainder. Yet B's interest in both
dispositions is subject to the same condition, the condition that
he survive A. The only difference is the verbal one between
precedent and subsequent form. As to C's interest, in both dispositions it is subject to a condition precedent and therefore
contingent; but because of the artificial condition-limitation distinction it is an executory interest in the former disposition and
an alternative contingent remainder in the latter.
The distinction between conditions precedent and certain limitations operates in a similar way. B has a vested remainder
subject to defeasance in the limitational sense in the disposition
"to A for life, then to B for life, then to C." The disposition "to
A for life, then to B if he survives A; otherwise to C" gives B a

contingent remainder. Although the substance of B's interest is
not identical in each disposition, it is the same in that B must
survive A in order to take possession. Not all limitations work

this way, of course; under some the future interest is certain of
becoming possessory - for example, "to A for life, then to B for
ten years, then to C." But when the limitation makes the interest
uncertain of becoming possessory, it operates identically to a
condition precedent, and the different treatment from the standpoint of vesting is artificial.
Nevertheless, several important legal consequences flow from
the distinction between interests which are vested subject to defeasance and those which are contingent.49 Contingent remainders
and executory interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, whereas vested remainders subject to defeasance are not.50
In addition, it has occasionally been held that, when a condition
is illegal, the gift becomes absolute if the interest is vested sub"Halbach, Vested and Contingent Remainders: A Premature Requiem for

Distinctions Between Conditions Precedent and Subsequent, in PERSPECTIVES OF
LAW: ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT I52 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A.

Sutherland eds. I964). Consequences sometimes thought to depend on the distinction, but which do not in fact turn on it, are waste, third party liability,
and partition. Id. 156-57.

50 In some states, including California, this is the only situation in which the
contingent-vested subject to defeasance distinction has any legal consequence.
Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision in California: Perpetual Trusts Permitted, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 678, 679 n.4 (I967).
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ject to defeasance, but that both the condition and the gift are

defeated if the interest is contingent.5" Although vested remainders subject to defeasance are unquestionably alienable and

subject to the claims of creditors, contingent remainders and

executory interests continue to be treated as inalienable in some
states;52 and in a few others, such interests are inalienable if
contingent as to person but alienable if contingent as to event.53
In regard to creditors' rights, it might be expected that creditors
can reach interests which are alienable,54 and this is the case
under the federal Bankruptcy Act.55 Yet, in insolvency proceedings in a number of states in which contingent remainders and
executory interests are voluntarily alienable, they are nevertheless protected from the reach of creditors. In the handful of
states in which such interests are not alienable, they are of course
not reachable by creditors either.56 In some of the states in which
they are alienable, they are nevertheless immune from judgment

51 E.g., Winterland v. Winterland, 389 Ill. 384, 59 N.E.2d 66i (0945). See 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 27.22. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

? 65, comments e & f (1959), with RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 424, comment d,
at 2478-79 (i944); id. ? 425, comment h, at 2486; id. ? 426, comment e, at
249I; id. ? 427, comment f, at 2495; id. ? 428, comment 1, at 2509-Io; id. ? 429,

comment j, at 25,9; and id. ? 433, comment f, at 2537. See also 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY ? 27.23, bosed on Browder, Illegal Conditions and Limitations:

Effect of Illegality, 47 MICH. L. REv. 759, 762-74 (I949).
52See, e.g., Roper v. Finney, 7 Ill. 2d 487, I3i N.E.2d io6 (0956). In keeping
with the Restatement's position that all future interests except powers of termina-

tion should be alienable inter vivos, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ?? I59-63 (I936),
contingent remainders and executory interests are freely alienable in the vast majority of states. Inalienability, however, means only that the interest is not gratuitously transferable by quitclaim deed to a stranger to the title, since (I) even
inalienable interests can be released, (2) a specifically enforceable contract to
convey arises in equity from an attempted transfer for valuable consideration, and
(3) the doctrine of estoppel by deed is invoked in law when there is an attempted

transfer by warranty deed. Halbach, Creditors' Rights in Future Interests, 43
MINN. L. REV. 2I7, 224-25 (I958).

53 See, e.g., In re Clayton's Estate, I95 Md. 622, 74 A.2d i (I950); N.J. STAT.
ANN ? 46:3-7 (I940).

54 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ?? i66-67 (I936).

" The trustee in bankruptcy gains title to all future interests which were transferable by any means by the bankrupt before bankruptcy or, if in real property,
which become transferable within six months after bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act
? 7oa(7), II U.S.C. ? iio(a)(7) (I970). The weight of authority appears to be
that the phrase "by any means" does not cover contingent interests in states in
which such interests continue to be treated as inalienable, even though such interests can in practice be alienated by the devices outlined in note 52 supra.
SCHWARTZ ? 3.12; Halbach, supra note 52, at 238-42. But see In re Landis, 4I
F.2d 700 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Farmers Bank v. Bickenbach, 282 U.S.
872 (I930).

56E.g., Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598, 5o N.E.2d 720 (I943).
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sale when the contingency is remote on the ground that a sacrificial
sale should be avoided; but if the same condition is stated in
subsequent form, creditors can reach the interest.57 The artificial
condition precedent-condition subsequent distinction also makes
a difference for purposes of the Rule of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders. As its name implies, this rule applies only

to contingent remainders, not to vested ones. But the destructibility rule is nearly obsolete, and in any event it aplies only to

legal remainders in real property.58
There are, however, situations where it is justifiable to make
certain legal consequences depend on whether a condition is

stated in precedent or subsequent form. One such situation is
illustrated by the following two dispositions: (I) "to A for life,
then to B if he attains 2I; otherwise to C," and (2) "to A for

life, then to B, but if he dies without attaining 2I, to C." In
these dispositions the event decisive to the condition may or may
not happen prior to the termination of the preceding life estate.
If B is under the age of 2 Iwhen A dies, B's interest will not be-

come possessory in the first disposition unless and until he reaches

2I,59 but in the second it will become possessory immediately

upon A's death, subject to being lost if he dies under 2I. An-

other such situation occurs when a prior interest fails for some rea-

son and the question is whether a succeeding future interest should
be accelerated. If the future interest is subject to an unfulfilled
condition precedent, it is usually said that there can be no acceleration, whereas the contrary rule obtains when the condition is

stated in subsequent form.Y0 These results seem justified,6" but
not because the interest is in one case technically vested and in

the other contingent. Rather, the choice between precedent and
57 E.g., Adams v. Dugan, I96 Okla. I56, I63 P.2d 227 (I945); see Halbach,
supra note 49, at I59-6I. In a few states, creditors can attach a contingent interest but cannot force a judgment sale until it vests. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. ?

8-534 (I957). In Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. II, 258 N.W. 39I (I935), the court
held that vested remainders subject to defeasance and contingent remainders should

not be treated differently, and that the appropriate relief is a lien on the debtor's
interest until the condition either occurs or does not occur.

58 See note 33 supra.
"9 This of course assumes that the destructibility rule is either abolished or
inapplicable. If the interest were an income interest under a trust, statutes in a
few states appear to give B the right to intermediate income anyway. E.g., CALIF.
CIV. CODE ? 733 (West 1954).

60 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 2I.41. When the condition precede
one of survivorship, however, and the prior interest which fails is a life estate,
some courts construe the survivorship requirement as relating to the life estate

rather than to the life tenant. Id. ? 21.42; SIMES & SMIMH ? 796.

61 Halbach, supra note 49, at i68-70, believes that the distinction operates
artificially even here.
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subsequent language is helpful, though not decisive, in determin-

ing the transferor's intent as to the time of taking. Moreover, for
other purposes the condition precedent-condition subsequent distinction is still artificial even as to the above two illustrations.
For example, during A's lifetime the verbal difference does not

justify the rule in some states that B's interest is inalienable

in the first disposition though unquestionably alienable in the
second.

2. Reversionary Interests. - Reversions may or may not be
certain to become possessory; those which are, are classified as

indefeasibly vested. A common example of one not certain to

become possessory is the disposition "to A for life, then to B if
he survives A." The orthodox classification of the transferor's
unstated reversion in this example is vested subject to defeasance,

the rationale being that B's surviving or not surviving A is a
condition subsequent, not precedent.62 Yet, if the interest had

been a remainder, the failure of B's interest to vest would be
a condition precedent: "to A for life, then to B if he survives A;
otherwise to C" gives C a contingent remainder. Thus, the difference cannot be the verbal one of stating the condition in either
precedent or subsequent form, although this is the explanation

usually offered.63 The true reason is probably the one described

by Gray:
A remainder is created by the livery of seisin of the particular
estate... [A] reversion is independent of the ownership created by the livery . . . and, therefore, any condition affecting
it is a condition which, as to it,is subsequent.64

In other words, instead of being vested because they are subject
to a condition subsequent, reversions which are uncertain of becoming possessory are deemed to be subject to a condition subsequent because they are vested. And they are vested because
the concept of vesting as to reversions still has not broken away
from livery of seisin.
For the other two types of reversionary interests - possibili-

ties of reverter and rights of entry 65 - to become possessory,
62 There is only a handful of decisions in which a reversion has been characterized as contingent. Frazer v. Board of Supervisors, 74 Ill. 282, 290 (i874);

King v. Wurts, 227 Ky. 705, 709-IO, I3 S.W.2d I043, I045 (1929) (dictum);
Floyd v. Carow, 88 N.Y. 560, 569 (i882) (dictum).

63 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 154, comment e, at 53I (1936).

1 J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 105 (4th ed. R. Gray I942)
[hereinafter cited as GRAY].

65 Under the Restatement's structure, rights of entry (powers of terminatio
are not technically regarded as "reversionary interests." A reversionary interest

is defined as "any future interest left in a transferor or his successor in interest."
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there must occur the uncertain event described in the limitation
or condition attached to the preceding defeasible interest. Whether
it is therefore a condition precedent, making them by definition
contingent reversionary interests, is disputed. Some authorities

view both interests as contingent;66 some view them both as
vested; 67 another thinks possibilities of reverter are vested
while rights of entry are not; 68 others do not care.69
Perhaps the last view is the most realistic, for the vesting con-

cept is largely irrelevant as to all reversionary interests. Legal
consequences stem from whether an interest is reversionary or
from what type of reversionary interest it is, rather than from
whether it is vested or contingent. Whether contingent or not, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are exempt from the Rule

Against Perpetuities, probably for mostly historical reasons.70

They are inalienable in several states,7' but not because of any
conclusion that they are contingent.72 Because of the near unaRESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 154(l) (1936). Rights of entry fall outside this
definition because they are treated as future interests newly created in the trans-

feror or his successor in interest. Id. ? I54, comment a, at 526; id. ? I55. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, rights of entry are treated like reversionary
interests in this discussion.
66 I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ?? 4.6, 4.12; SIMES & SMITH ?? 28I, I238.
The Restatement classifies possibilities of reverter as contingent, but does not

classify rights of entry in terms of vesting at all. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ?

I54, comment e, at 53I (I936).

67 Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England, 70 HARV. L. REV. I4II,
I417 (1957). Professor Leach carefully placed the word "vested" in quotation
marks, presumably indicating that this is not his view of how they should be
treated, but his understanding of how courts treat them. See also SCHWARTZ ?
6.IO.

68 GRAY 105-08.
66 BERGIN & HASKELL 66.

70 Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rules Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 72I, 740 (I952). Although all the existing American decisions are
unanimous in exempting these interests from the Rule, in the vast majority of

states there are no decisions at all on the question. Leach, Perpetuities: The

Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 980 (I965).
71 Rights of entry are probably inalienable in a few more states than are possi-

bilities of reverter. In addition, some decisions have held that an attempted aliena-

tion of a right of entry results in its extinguishment. Agnor, supra note 25, at
1432-36; Dunham, supra note 3I, at 22I-22.
72 See, e.g., King v. Wurts, 227 Ky. 705, 709-10, I3 S.W.2d 1043, 1045 (1929).

The court was uncertain whether the interest was a possibility of reverter,: and
hence inalienable, or a "contingent" reversion, in which case it would have been

alienable because Kentucky is a state which recognizes the alienability of con-

tingent future interests. This question did not have to be decided because even if
the interest was a possibility of reverter, it was nevertheless releasable; and that

is what happened in the case. Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry have
subsequently been held to be alienable in Kentucky. Austin v. Calvert, 262 S.W.

2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
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nimity that reversions are vested subject to defeasance,73 it is a

matter of conjecture whether reversions, if they were to be held
to be contingent when uncertain of becoming possessory, would
be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities or be inalienable in
those states in which contingent interests are still inalienable.
C. Reversionary and Nonreversionary Interests
Superficially, the differentiation of interests left or created in
a transferor from those created in a transferee appears to be a

sensible and easy distinction to draw. That it is in fact neither
can be quickly demonstrated.
In the case of inter vivos transfers the distinction makes for

easy circumvention of such underlying policies as there are. Be-

cause possibilities of reverter and rights of entry 7 are exempt
from the Rule Against Perpetuities, a common device for assuring the validity of executory interests which follow fees simple
determinable or fees simple subject to a condition subsequent is
to convey the fee interest one day and the reversionary interest the
next 75 - or to convey the fee interest by deed and the reversion-

ary interest by will.76 That way, the grantee or devisee of the gift
over receives a possibility of reverter or right of entry rather than
an executory interest. Only the ill-advised would convey "to A for

as long as the premises are used for residential purposes, and upon

the cessation of such use, to B." The same two-instrument
method can also be utilized to give a transferee a reversion rather

than a remainder, thereby avoiding the Rule in Shelley's Case
when the future interest is to be devised to the heirs of the life
tenant.

As regards testamentary transfers, the differentiation of re-

versionary from nonreversionary interests is unsatisfactory for
two reasons. One is that it is fuzzy. Possibilities of reverter and
reversions need not be explicitly created; it is unclear whether
a residuary clause passes a reversionary or a nonreversionary in73 See p. 747 & note 62 supra. Frazer v. Board of Supervisors, 74 Ill. 282
(I874), apparently is the only decision in which a reversion has actually been
held to be "contingent." As a result, the reversion apparently was inalienable,
although the court noted that the interest would inure to the grantee of the reversion under the estoppel by deed doctrine if the reversion became vested.

74 See note 65 supra.
7 E.g., SCHWARTZ ? 6.3i. The feasibility of this method is of course reduced

in those states in which these interests are inalienable, though even here the
methods cited in note 52 supra are still usually available for possibilities of reverter. SCHWARTZ ? 3.3.

76 Very few states refuse to permit such interests to be passed by will. Illinois,
though, does have such a restriction, forcing them to pass by intestacy. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 30, ? 37b (I969).
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terest when an incomplete interest is devised in one part of a will.
For example, if a testator devises "to A for life, then to B if he

survives A," with a residuary clause in favor of C, it may be important to determine whether C takes a vested reversion subject

to defeasance or a contingent remainder. Or, when the devise is
"to A for as long as the premises are used for residential purposes"
with a residuary clause in favor of B, if B takes an executory interest it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, but if it is a possibility of reverter B takes, it is valid. Although this question has
divided the courts,77 most scholars have argued strongly that a
residuary clause should be deemed to pass a nonreversionary interest on the theory that all parts of a will take effect simultaneously.78 As Professor Simes put it, the transferor "did not die
twice." 7
This observation leads to the second and more important rea-

son the distinction is unsatisfactory: it is artificial. Since the
testator is dead, it is difficult to apply to his situation the standard

definition that reversionary interests are those left in a transferor
after he has transferred a lesser interest.80 Furthermore, if the

transferor has not died twice when the unstated interest passes
under a residuary clause, is it reasonable to view him as having
died twice when it passes by intestacy? For other purposes,8'
such as the destructibility rule,82 it is widely agreed that interests
created in a will and interests passing by intestacy take effect
77Some treat it as a reversionary interest. See, e.g., Gridley v. Gridley, 399

Ill. 2I5, 77 N.E.2d I46 (1948) (reversion); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church,
325 Mass. 645, 9'i N.E.2d 922 (1950) (possibility of reverter). Others, as a nonreversionary interest. See, e.g., Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 498-99,

113 N.E. 48i, 483-84 (IgI6) (vested remainder); Ringgold v. Carvel, I96 Md.
262, 272-73, 76 A.2d 327, 332 (I950) (court identified the interest variously as a

reversion and as a vested remainder). The Coquillard and Ringgold decisions
appear to think that the remainder is "vested," but it seems apparent that, if a
remainder, it is "contingent." See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 278, comment
d, at 1440-4I (1940).

78 I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 4.29; A. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS
AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS ? 95 (2d ed. 1920); 2

POWELL ?f 274; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 278, comment d, at 1440-4I (1940);
SIMES & SMITH ? I24I. Gray's view, however, was that a residuary clause passes
a reversionary interest. GRAY 104.

79 Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doc-

trine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 179-8o n.4 (I953).
80The Restatement dodges this difficulty by defining reversionary interests as
those "left in a transferor or his successor in interest." RESTATEMENT OF PROP-

ERTY ? I54(0) (1936) (emphasis added). Successor in interest is deemed to mea
a testator's heirs or next of kin. Id. comment b, at 527.

81 See T. ATKINSON, WILLS 505, 56I-64 (2d ed. I953); UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE ? 3-IOI (I969).
82 See SIMES & SMITH ? I97, at 225.
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simultaneously; and intestate succession is treated as an actual
transfer from the decedent to his heirs, not a mere sliding by the
heirs into the place of the decedent.83 Yet, under the present
structure of estates it is unquestioned that, in the absence of a
residuary clause, the interest passing to the heirs is reversionary.
Perhaps the bar to concluding that all interests created at death
are nonreversionary is the rule, sometimes stated, that remainders
must not only be created simultaneously with the particular estate

but also in the same instrument.84 The reason for this "rule,"
however, unless it is thought to be another way of saying that a

remainder and the particular estate must be created simultaneously, is apparently tied to history, and the "rule" should not

be allowed to prevent a realistic appraisal of interests created at

83E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I20, ?? 375(I)-(2) (I969). At common law, a
legacy under a will can be renounced or disclaimed, the renunciation relating back
to the decedent's death and operating as a nonacceptance. A renunciation or disclaimer of an intestate share, however, is said to operate as a transfer from the

disclaiming heir to the person who takes the disclaimed portion on the theory that
intestate succession cannot be refused because it arises by operation of law.
Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, i98 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836

(I952); Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N.W.2d 729 (i943). This distinction perhaps lends support to the idea that an heir merely slides into the place of

the decedent. But it is a mindless distinction, rooted in feudalism. See Lauritzen,

Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 568 (I953). One mindless distinction thus supports another. The legislative trend is toward permitting an heir
to renounce or disclaim on the same basis as a legatee. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ?
I53-5-43 (I963); HAWAII REV. STAT. ?? 538-I, -3 (I968); ch. III, ? I5-2-80I,

[197I] Idaho Session Laws 267; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, ? I5b (I969); IND. ANN.

STAT. ? 6-604 (I953); KAN. STAT. ANN. ? 59-229I (Supp. I969); MD. ANN. CODE

art. 93, ? 9-IOI (SuPP. 1971); MICH. iCOMP. LAWS ANN. ? 554.50I (I97I); MINN.
STAT. ANN. ? 525.532 (I969); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW ? 4-I.3 (McKinney I967); N.C. GEN. STAT. ? 29-IO (I966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ? 2105.06I

(Baldwin I971); ORE. REV. STAT. ? II2.675 (I969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ??

34-5-I to -I2 (I969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. ? 43-4-29 (Supp. I97I); W.
VA. CODE ANN. ? 42-4-3 (I966); WIS. STAT. ANN. ? 852.I3 (Supp. I970);

see FLA. STAT. ANN. ? 73I.23(8) (Supp. I971). Some of these statutes are patterned after model disclaimer acts promulgated by the American Bar Association. Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation of the A.B.A. Section of Real

Property, Probate & Trust Law, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary

Dispositions-Suggestions for Model Acts, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 658
(I969). The Idaho statute is ? 2-80I of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). If
the UPC gains widespread adoption, the number of states which allow heirs to
renounce or disclaim will of course increase significantly. At this writing Idaho

is the only state to have enacted the UPC, but its adoption in 12 additional states,
9 of which do not now have such a disclaimer statute, is believed to be probable
in the near future. See Committee on Uniform Probate Code of the A.B.A. Sec-

tion of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law, Progress on the Uniform Probate
Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 375, 376 (I97I).

84 E.g., SCHWARTZ ? 2.3; -SIMES & SMITH ? I03.
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death from prevailing. Realistically, it is hard to see how any interest created at death can be viewed as reversionary.

III. THE PROPOSED REFORMULATION

The proposal for the restructuring of estates advanced here
has several objectives. It seeks to simplify the present structure

as drastically as possible without substantially reducing flexibility
for the gratuitous transmission of family wealth or for the commercial transfer of property. At the same time it seeks to improve the quality of the law by removing the artificiality that
now pervades the area, by forestalling circumvention, and by
eliminating the classificatory mystique. Ambitious as these objectives are, they are achievable under a reformulation of the
structure which assures that property interests which in substance
operate the same way are grouped in the same categories even

though they may be stated differently in form. Toward this end,
the proposed reformulated structure would not recognize the
sources of the deficiencies in the present structure: the distinctions between conditions and limitations, between conditions
precedent and subsequent, and between reversionary and nonreversionary interests. Future interests, moreover, would be

categorized solely by their own nature.

Specifically, possessory interests would undergo an important
but not dramatic change. Those which will not terminate would
continue to be called interests in fee simple absolute. Those which
will terminate would also retain their present titles: life estates
or terms of years. Those which might terminate would still be
called defeasible, but the term defeasible would be restricted to
these interests. It would not cover, as it now technically does,
interests which are certain to terminate. Furthermore, defeasible
interests would not be distinguished on the basis of being either
subject to a condition or subject to a limitation. "To A for as
long as the premises are used for residential purposes, and upon
the cessation of such use, to B" and "to A, but if the premises
cease being used for residential purposes, then to B" would carry
the same classification. Since A's interest in both cases terminates
upon the happening of the same uncertain event, in both it would
be an interest in fee simple defeasible. Life estates or terms of

years, of course, could also be made defeasible under the reformulated structure. Although it will be seen that rights of entry do
not retain a separate identity under the reformulated structure,

the merger of possessory interests subject to a limitation and those
subject to a condition subsequent would not be prevented even

if they did, for a defeasible interest followed by a right of entry
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would simply be treated as terminating upon the exercise of the
right rather than upon the occurrence of the event which makes

the right exercisable.
The change in future interests would be more radical. Elim-

inating the condition-limitation distinction would abolish the

difference between remainders and executory interests and remove
one of the bases upon which possibilities of reverter are distinguished from rights of entry. Dropping the reversionary-nonreversionary distinction would nullify the difference between
reversions and remainders and part of the difference between
rights of entry and executory interests. The elimination of the

condition precedent-condition subsequent distinction would permit possibilities of reverter and reversions to be merged. Thus,

four of the five types of future interests currently recognized as
having separate identities would be assimilated under the same

title - simply "future interest" for want of a better term
leaving only rights of entry to be accounted for.
Even in the absence of the condition-limitation and rever-

sionary-nonreversionary distinctions, rights of entry are still

theoretically different from the other future interests in that they
are the only interests which do not automatically entitle the
holder to possession when the event upon which they are predicated occurs. Because of the reasons developed previously,85
however, it would be futile to insist on prolonging the separate
identity of rights of entry. Consequently, they too would be assimilated along with the other future interests under the reformu-

lated structure. Assimilation of this sort, of course, would in
effect constitute an abolition of rights of entry, and in this respect
the reformulated structure would provide less flexibility than does
the present structure. But this reduction in flexibility is not especially significant for two reasons. First, under the present structure the conceptual uniqueness of the right of entry has often
been disregarded by the law. The interest has frequently been
treated the same as one which takes effect automatically, in spite
of any conceptual difference. Secondly, the transferor can still
utilize either a power of revocation or a power of appointment to
accomplish somewhat the same objective, at least during the lifetime of the holder of the power, or, in the case of commercial
transactions such as a lease or mortgage, during the duration of
the encumbrance.86 Indeed, language which is clearly in right of
entry terms could and undoubtedly would be construed, under
the reformulated structure, as creating a power of revocation or
of appointment whether the defeasible possessory interest is
85 See p. 742 supra.
86 SIMES & SMITH ? 243.
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described in conditional or limitational language. A power of
revocation or of appointment, however, would not be implied

merely from language of corndition as is a right of entry under
the present structure.

Although all future interests would be assimilated under one
title, they would be differentiated from one another in terms of
vesting. The concept of vesting, however, would be revised to take
into account the elimination of the distinction between conditions
precedent on the one hand and conditions subsequent and limita-

tions on the other. Accordingly, future interests not certain to
become possessory, including those in unborn or unascertained
persons as well as those dependent upon the occurrence or non-

occurrence of an uncertain event, would be called contingent.87
In other words, most interests which are presently labeled vested

subject to defeasance would be contingent under the reformulated
structure, reversing the maxim that the law favors the vesting of

estates.88 Thus, B's interest in the following examples would be
contingent: "to A for life, then to B, but if B fails to survive A,
then to C"; "to A for life, then to B, but if he dies without attain-

ing 2 I, to C" (A is alive but B is not yet 2I); and "to A for life,
then to B for life, then to C" (A and B are both alive). Also
contingent would be interests subject to a power - a power of
appointment, a power to consume, sell, or dispose, or a power to
invade corpus.
Conversely, the only future interests which the reformulated
structure would call vested would be those certain to become possessory. If the ultimate number of takers is certain and the interest will be in fee simple absolute once it becomes possessory,

the interest would retain the present label of indefeasibly
vested;89 if the number is uncertain, the interest would continue
87 A similar proposal was advanced in Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. I255, 1267-69 (I960).

88 This common law rule of construction has several meanings.
by Professor Rabin, it means that, unless the transferor manifests a contrary intent,

(i) future interests are construed to become indefeasibly vested at the
earliest possible time;
(2) conditions are not readily implied, and are construed as narrowly
as possible;

(3) future interests are characterized as defeasibly vested rather than

contingent.

Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 467,

469-70 (I965) (footnotes omitted). Professor Rabin's quarrel is with subrule (2),
a rule I believe to be sound. Waggoner, Future Interests Legislation: Implied
Conditions of Survivorship and Substitutionary Gifts Under the New Illinois
"Anti-Lapse" Provision, I969 U. ILL. L.F. 423. My quarrel in the present article

is, of course, only with subrule (3).
89 Although most executory interests would be characterized as contingent fu-

ture interests under the reformulated structure, those which are certain to become
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to be called vested subject to open. This leaves unaccounted
those future interests in which the number of takers is certain
and the ultimate taking is assured, but which will not be in fee

simple absolute. An example is B's interest in "to A for life, then
to B for io years, then to C." Although it might be appropriate
to call such future interests vested subject to defeasance, this
solution is not proposed here. Rather, such interests would be
labeled indefeasibly vested under the reformulated structure.
It seems to make more sense to categorize future interests from
the standpoint of vesting solely on the basis of the way they
operate as future interests and to indicate in another way how

the interest will operate after possession occurs. Thus, the full
classification of B's interest would be an indefeasibly vested future interest in a term of years. In addition, in order to be sure

that the condition precedent-condition subsequent or limitation
distinction is completely removed from the law, it seems desirable
to eliminate entirely the vested subject to defeasance category.
It may be noted that C's interest in the above example would also

be indefeasibly vested, but would, of course, be in fee simple
absolute. Consequently, under the reformulated structure an indefeasibly vested future interest could follow another indefeasibly
vested future interest, although they could not both be interests
in fee simple absolute.
THE REFORMULATED HIERARCHY

Possessory Interests Future Interests

Fee Simple Absolute None permissible
Defeasible Fee Simple Contingent
Life Estate (may or may not be de- Contingent (not certain to become pos-

feasible) sessory); Alternative Contingent Future Interest

Vested Subject to Open; Contingent (in
unborn class members)

Indefeasibly Vested
Term of Years Same as with Life Estate

To summarize, the reformulated structure is based on the
premise that the only appropriate distinctions are between cer-

tainty and uncertainty as to the termination of possessory interests and between certainty and uncertainty as to the ultimate
possession of future interests. Possessory interests, by the terms
of the particular transfer, either will not terminate (fee simple
absolute), will terminate (life estate or term of years), or will
possessory, such as "to A forty years from date," would be reclassified as indefeasibly vested.
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possibly terminate (defeasible interest). Future interests either
will become possessory (indefeasibly vested), will become possessory but with a now uncertain number of takers (vested subject

to open), or will possibly become possessory (contingent). The
reformulated structure is shown in the accompanying chart, which

should be compared with the chart of the present structure of
estates given earlier.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED REFORMULATION

ON CERTAIN RULES OF PROPERTY

A. Various Minority Rules
Apart from grouping together interests which in substance

operate the same way, what would be the impact of the reformulated structure? First, the scope of several minority rules might
be expanded. Since the revised definition of contingent interests
is considerably broader than the present definition, the rule of
inalienability of contingent future interests would render inalienable many interests now freely transferable. The broadened
definition of contingent interests and the assimilation of all future
interests under one title might mean that more real property interests would be subject to being eliminated under the destructibility rule. Finally, the assimilation of all future interests might
also cause the Rule in Shelley's Case to be held to apply to any

future interest in real property in the heirs or the heirs of the
body of a life tenant, whereas it now theoretically applies only to
remainders.90
These undesirable results can be avoided by simply abolishing
the rules. The inalienability rule is derived from the now-rejected
notion that contingent future interests are not present interests

in which possession is postponed and uncertain, but rather interests which arise in the future.9" Based solidly in the feudal system, the destructibility rule and the Rule in Shelley's Case should
never have been adopted in America in the first place.92 The ab90 Dukeminier, supra note iO, at 20-23, points out that in actuality there appear to be no decisions refusing to apply the Rule in Shelley's Case on the ground
that the interest was an executory interest, and that in one decision, Darragh v.
Barmore, 242 S.W. 7I4 (Tex. 'Comm'n App. 1922), the Rule was applied to an
executory interest.

91 See Halbach, supra note 49, at 157. The question of the rights of creditors

would be better handled on some basis other than whether the interest is con-

tingent or vested. See PP. 745-46 & note 57 supra.
92See W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED! 52-58 (I967); Browder, supra
note 87, at I259-63; Halbach, supra note 49, at 158-59.

Although the reformulated structure would not expand the scope of the doctrine of worthier title, it would be appropriate to abolish this rule at the same
time.
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olition of these rules in the Uniform Property Act 93 and, in whole
or in part, in the statutes of a great majority of states 94 demonstrates their utter inappropriateness. Surely the expansion of
their scope under the reformulated structure would encourage
their abolition in the states in which they are still followed.
B. Failure of Succeeding Interests

The effect of the failure of a succeeding interest when the
transferor has not indicated who should take the property in this

event would become more automatic with the abolition of the
condition-limitation distinction. On the theory that a condition
subsequent indicates, just as strongly as does a limitation, that
the preceding defeasible interest is to terminate despite the failure

of the succeeding interest, 95 the preceding defeasible interest,
whether subject to a condition or limitation, would terminate and

the property would return to the transferor or his successor in
interest. The only exception to this, apart from situations in

which the transferor expressly manifests a different intention,
would be instances in which the interest of the transferor or his
successor in interest is invalid because it violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities. In these cases, as explained in the next section, the
preceding defeasible interest would become absolute.

C. The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities

This brings us to a consideration of the impact of the reformulated structure on the common law Rule Against Perpetui-

ties.9" Although the paramount objective of the reformulated
structure is not to work perpetuity reform, its adoption would

extend the scope of the Rule in desirable directions. To put the
matter into some perspective at the outset, it might be noted that

the impact on the Rule of the reformulated structure would be
similar in two respects to that of one form of proposed perpetuity
reform -the proposal to change the Rule so that instead of re-

quiring certainty of vesting in interest, if at all, within a life in
being plus 2I years, it requires certainty of vesting in possession
and enjoyment, if at all, within that period.97 Both this proposal
93 UNIFORM PROPERTY Ac ?? 7, I2, I4, i6 (1938).
94 The trend toward the abolition of these rules is reported in SIMES & SMITH
?? 207-09 (destructibility), I563-7I (Rule in Shelley's Case), I6I2 (worthier
title), I858-63 (inalienability).

" See pp. 736-38 supra.
96 The current status of statutory modifications to the common law Rule can
be found in SIMES & SMITH ?? I4II-39.

1' This proposal was advanced and fully worked out in Schuyler, supra note

46, at 926-52. Gray also felt that the Rule would have been improved by shifting
its emphasis to vesting in possession. GRAY 82I-22.
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and the reformulated structure would extend the application of
the Rule to those interests - rights of entry, possibilities of reverter, and defeasibly vested reversions and remainders - which
currently enjoy an exempt status even though they are not certain to become possessory; and neither would change the way

the Rule now operates on future interests which are vested subject to open.
The similarity stops at this point. The vesting-in-possession
proposal in its pure form would extend the Rule to indefeasibly

vested reversions and remainders - interests which both presently and under the reformulated structure are exempt because

they are certain to become possessory.98 And, even as to some
presently exempt interests which are not cetain to become pos-

sessory - defeasibly vested reversions and remainders - the
vesting in possession proposal is obviously considerably stricter
than the reformulated structure, under which vesting in interest
would be sufficient. Finally, requiring vesting in possession would

alter the Rule's operation on interests which are not now exempt
contingent remainders and executory interests.

The reformulated structure has none of these latter effects.
The Rule would continue to be focused only on certainty of vesting in interest. Yet, if the Rule also continues to operate on

contingent future interests as it does now on contingent interests,
it will extend to currently exempt interests which are not certain

to become possessory because of the revised definition of the concept of vesting and the assimilation of all future interests under
one label, especially the equating of reversionary and nonrever-

sionary interests. The reformulated structure thus brings possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, vested reversions subject

to defeasance, most vested remainders subject to defeasance, and
resulting trusts within the reach of the Rule by recategorizing
them as contingent future interests. The succeeding discussion
works out the effects of applying to these interests the Rule as
98 The proposal to make the Rule applicable to remoteness of possession would
thus either invalidate or alter some trust interests in which the payment of princi-

pal or portions thereof is directed to be made at designated ages over 2I when
such payment is not conditioned on the beneficiaries' surviving to those designated
ages. For example, although the interest of the settlor's children in the principal
of the following irrevocable inter vivos trust is now valid, under the vest-in-possession proposal it would either be invalid or the age requirement would have to

be lowered to 2I (or the proposal would have to entail an alteration of the period
of the Rule, for example, to a life in being plus 30 or 40 years): "Income to the
settlor for life, and upon the settlor's death to divide the trust into equal shares,

one share for each of the settlor's children then living. Each share shall be held
as a separate trust to pay the income therefrom to the child until he reaches 30
or until his death, whichever occurs first, the corpus of each trust to be payable
to the child at age 30."
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it now stands. Fortunately, in the cases where the effect is unsatisfactory, statutory repair is possible without reintroducing

the artificial distinctions which the reformulated structure eliminates. With statutory adjustments for certain cases, the reformulated structure puts the Rule on a basis sounder than its present
one.
i. Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry. -The re-

formulated structure would eliminate the exemption of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry by classifying such interests as

contingent future interests or as powers of revocation or of appointment.99 Unless the specified event is tied to a life in being
plus 2 I years, the contingent interest or the power would be void
ab initio, transforming the possessory interest into a fee simple
absolute.'00 Eliminated also would be the two-instrument method
of avoiding invalidity of an executory interest that might vest too
remotely, and the uncertainty as to whether a residuary clause

passes a valid possibility of reverter or an invalid executory interest.101
The rendering of all remote possibilities of reverter and rights

of entry invalid from their inception, however, is undesirable, although it is a better basis to work from than their present status
in most states of being exempt from any restriction.'02 The life in

being plus 2 I year period is relevant to gratuitous, family dispositions, and in these cases it seems reasonable that no exception from
the Rule be made.103 However, these two types of interests are perhaps more frequently created as a part of a commercial transac-

tion or charitable transfer. Since the period of the Rule bears
less or no relationship to these situations, an alternative approach
might incorporate the solution which a handful of states have

adopted in handling all possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry. Instead of legislating them subject to the Rule, these states
have provided that such interests cease to be valid a certain number of years (usually from thirty to fifty) after their creation.'04
The effect of such future interests' failing to become possessory
"See pp. 753-54 supra.

100 Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terro
HARV. L. REV. 72I, 74I (1952).

101 See pp. 749-50 supra.

102 J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 2I
I962) [hereinafter cited as MORRIS & LEACH].

103But cf. L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING
LEGISLATION 203-04 (I960); Schuyler, supra note 46, at 936.

104 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, ? 37e (I969). The approaches of various
states are reviewed in L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note IO3, at 205-I3, with
Model Acts presented at 2I4-I7. There is also a Uniform Act Relating to Reverter of Realty, I944 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 209, but it has never been adopted.
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within the specified time is, again, that the possessory interest
becomes a fee simple absolute.'05 This approach could be accommodated by the reformulated structure with a statutory provision stating that contingent future interests or powers of revocation or of appointment which follow fees simple defeasible
and which are incident to bona fide commercial transactions or
to charitable transfers are not subject to the Rule, but rather
are extinguished after the designated period in gross. Even under
this approach the reformulated structure is superior to the present
structure because the reformulation provides no basis for a different treatment of what are now executory interests following
defeasible fees. Although there is certainly no reason in policy

to have a different rule for executory interests,10" they do no
come within the terms of the existing period in gross statutes,
and are instead subject to the Rule.
It might be desirable, further, to exempt certain commercial
transactions from both the Rule and the period in gross restriction. This might be appropriate, for example, for rights of entry

for nonpayment of rent or for default in mortgage covenants.107
Since under the reformulated structure rights of entry in these
types of situations would undoubtedly be replaced by powers of
revocation or of appointment, this exemption should refer both
to contingent future interests and to powers incident to defeasible

fees or defeasible terms of years arising out of the specified types
of transactions.

2. Vested Reversions Subject to Defeasance. - As contingent
future interests, defeasibly vested reversions would be within the

scope of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Yet, the possibility of
their invalidity causing a preceding life estate to become a fee
simple absolute or causing property to escheat to the state is unacceptable. Close analysis, however, reveals that, with one exception which will be discussed later, 108 vested reversions subject to defeasance would not appear to violate the Rule. Since
they are originally held by the transferor in the case of inter
vivos transfers or by his heirs in the case of testamentary dispositions, there is at the time of transfer no uncertainty as to
the identity of the takers of these interests. Nor, being unstated,
would they be subject to any express uncertainties. Consequently,
the uncertainty over whether they will become possessory arises
105 See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 228, comment d (1936); Schuyler, supra
note 46, at 936.

106 See Schuyler, supra note 46, at 936.

107 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, ? 379 (I969). See also authorities cite
note I03 supra; L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 8i (I955).
108 See pp. 764-65 infra.
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solely from the fact that an expressly stated contingent future

interest or interests have priority and might become possessory

instead. If the expressly stated interest or interests are valid, the
alternative unstated interest is valid also, since all depend on the
outcome of events which must occur or not occur within the period
of the Rule. But if the expressly stated interest or interests are
invalid because they violate the Rule, they are invalid ab initio
and the rest of the disposition takes effect as if they were not

present.109 If, then, the validity of alternative future interests is
determined not simultaneously but according to the order in which
they are stated, with the validity of any unstated interest being
determined last, when the expressly stated interest or interests
violate the Rule, that removes the only uncertainty attached to
the alternative unstated interest. Subject of course to the doctrine
of infectious invalidity, the alternative unstated interest is valid

because it is indefeasibly vested from its inception.
Although this reasoning is believed to be sound and to be
supported by analogous precedent,110 the state of the law on the
question is uncertain.111 Thus, a statutory provision embodying
this reasoning, similar to the one found in the English Perpetui-

ties and Accumulations Act,112 should be included in any legislation adopting the reformulated structure.

The following testamentary disposition illustrates this anal-

ysis: "to A for life, then to A's children for the life of the survivor of A's children, then to A's grandchildren then living."
There is no residuary clause and A is the testator's only child
and his sole heir. Under both the present and the reformulated
structures, A's grandchildren have a contingent interest violating
the Rule. Also under both structures, the unstated interest that
A takes by intestate succession is valid and becomes possessory
at the termination of the life estate in A's children. A's unstated
interest is valid under the present structure because it is vested
subject to defeasance and not subject to the Rule. Under the reformulated structure, too, it is valid because it is not contingent:
the invalidity of the grandchildren's interest removes any un-

certainty over whether the unstated interest will become possessory. In the terminology of the present structure, the implied
condition that A as the testator's sole heir is to be divested of his
109 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 24.47; SIMES & SMITH ? I262.
1'I See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 24.49. The reasoning is also indirectly
supported by the broader, generally accepted proposition that when there is more
than one way of construing an interest, the construction that makes it valid is the

one which should be adopted. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ? 375 (I944);
SIMES & SMITH ? I288.

"I See MORRIS & LEACH I73-8I; id. 24-25 (First Supp. I964).

"2 Perpetuities & Accumulations Act I964, c. 55, ? 6.
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interest only if one or more of the grandchildren become entitled
to possession can never be fulfilled because their interest is invalid
ab initio. From its inception, therefore, A's interest is indefeasibly
vested.
The same analysis would apply to any unstated alternative
interest, regardless of whether it would be regarded as a rever-

sion under the present structure. Only when the unstated alterna-

tive interest is in the heir or heirs of the transferor, however,
as it is in the above example, is the doctrine of infectious invalidity completely inappropriate, since its application would put

the title in abeyance. But in other cases the doctrine of infectious
invalidity might be more applicable. For example, suppose the
same testamentary disposition except that the will contained a re-

siduary clause in favor of B, who is unrelated to A or his family.

Although the invalidity of the grandchildren's interest would
mean that B's interest is indefeasibly vested, a court intent on
carrying out the testator's wishes might apply the doctrine to B's

valid interest, since doing so would make it more likely that the
property would ultimately pass to A's grandchildren (B's valid
interest would become invalid, and the property would pass to A

by intestacy). The same analysis would be applicable if the
original disposition was an inter vivos transfer and the transferor
passed his interest to B by a later inter vivos instrument, by a
specific bequest in his will, or by the will's residuary clause.
3. Vested Remainders Subject to Defeasance. - Defeasibly

vested remainders may be divided into three categories for the
purposes of this discussion: those subject to a limitation, those

subject to a condition subsequent other than the nonexercise of
a power, and those subject to a power. Limitational ones would be
contingent when the nature of the limitation is such that it can
prevent the interest from becoming possessory. Nevertheless, this

reclassification would rarely result in a violation of the Rule.
For example, in the disposition "to A for life, then to B for life,

then to C for life, then to D," the contingent interests of B and
C would be valid because each person would constitute the measuring life for his own interest.
Remainders vested subject to a condition subsequent other

than the nonexercise of a power are typically the first of two
expressly stated alternative interests and present a somewhat
different problem. The condition of divestment making possession
uncertain is the condition precedent attached to the second al-

ternative interest - the executory interest. When this condition
can occur too remotely, the second interest is invalid even under
the present structure. The reformulated structure, classifying the
two as alternative contingent future interests, would also cause
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the first one to become invalid, thus closing the loophole which
now allows vested remainders subject to defeasance to escape the
Rule's scrutiny.

Would the invalidity of the first interest, under the analysis
applied to vested reversions subject to defeasance, allow the second

interest to be treated as valid? If so, the reformulated structure
would accomplish little. Indeed, if this were the effect, the present
structure provides a better solution because the transferor prob-

ably preferred the takers of the first alternative interest over those
of the second. Although this situation could be the result in a given
case, it is doubtful that special statutory adjustment is necessary.
The second alternative interest would ordinarily not be made
valid by the invalidity of the first interest because the uncertainty
over the second's becoming possessory is not often limited to the
first one's taking effect in possession instead. Frequently the

gift over will be in favor of a class which is subject to increase for

too long a time. An example would be a variation of the irrevocable inter vivos trust mentioned earlier.13 The settlor was to receive the income from that trust for life, then the corpus was to

be divided into equal shares or trusts, one for each of the settlor's
children then living. Each child was to receive the income from
his trust until age 30, when the corpus of his trust was to be payable to him. Suppose there were in addition a condition subsequent
with a gift over to the effect that if any child should die before
attaining the age of 30, the corpus of his trust should be paid
to his children. There would then be two contingent future interests, the children's and the grandchildren's. Assuming that in-

fectious invalidity is not applied to the income interest of the
settlor's children, the invalidity of the children's interest in the
corpus caused by the reformulated structure would not validate
the gift over to the grandchildren because their interest would
remain open until their parents either reached the age of 30 or died
under that age.

Furthermore, unlike defeasibly vested reversions, executory
interests are always expressly created. As a matter of construc-

tion, a court might conclude that the uncertainty of the second
interest's becoming possessory is not removed by the invalidity of
the first interest. An example would be: "to A for life, then to A's
children for the life of the survivor of A's children, then to B's
children, but if none is alive at the death of A's last surviving
child, then to C's children." Even though the interest held by C's
children will not remain open beyond the period of the Rule (unlike the alternative class gift in the example in the preceding
paragraph) and the interest held by B's children is invalid, C's
113 See note 98 supra.
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children's interest might be considered contingent on there being
no child of B alive at the death of A's last surviving child.114 Since
this uncertainty will not be resolved within the period of the
Rule, both of the alternative interests would be invalid.
The same analysis could be applied to the example with the
alternative class gift subject to open for too long a period. Suppose the alternative interest in that example, instead of being held

by a class that might remain open too long, were in favor either of
an individual or of a class whose maximum and minimum membership would be certain to be determined within the period of the
Rule. The interest still might be held to be invalid on the construction that it is contingent on the settlor's child's not living
to the age of 30 - despite the invalidity of the children's interest
in the corpus. The effect in both examples, of course, would be
that the third alternative interest, presently called a vested reversion subject to defeasance, would be valid and its holder would
become entitled to possession at the expiration of the valid interests.

The final of the three types of remainders vested subject to

defeasance, those subject to a power, also would be contingent
future interests under the reformulated structure. Here, the
analysis developed in regard to vested reversions subject to

defeasance would often be applicable. The uncertainty over
whether this type of contingent future interest will become possessory derives from the possibility that the power will be exercised.
If the power is invalid because it may either be acquired or
exercised at too remote a time, the invalidity of the power removes
that uncertainty, leaving the interest valid under the Rule.115
A presently exercisable general power, however, may be exercisable beyond the period of the Rule, but still be valid because
it will not be acquired too remotely. In this case the future interest subject to the power would be invalid under the reformulated
structure. This result is troublesome because the defeasibly
vested reversion would, as a contingent future interest, also be
invalid. The disposition of the property if the donee failed to
make a valid appointment could be resolved by statute in either
of two ways. One would make an exception from the Rule for
future interests which are contingent solely upon the nonexercise
of a valid, presently exercisable general power; the recipients of

the express gift in default would then be entitled to possession
upon the death of the donee. If, however, there is an additional
114 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY ? 24.49 case 77 & n.i; MoRRIs & LEACH
I 73-75.

115 See MORRIS & LEACH I77-78; id. 24 (First Supp. I964). But see Alexander

v. Alexander, 28 Eng. Rep. 408, 409-IO (Ch. I755), discussed in GRAY 279-80.
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uncertainty attached to the express gift in default, such as its
being subject to open for too long a time, it would remain invalid
and the holder of the interest now called a reversion would be
the one entitled to possession. The other and perhaps preferable
solution for this situation would be to require the application of
the capture doctrine in every case where there is an unexercised
presently exercisable general power. What justifies such a rule,
at least when the donee's death might not occur within the period
of the Rule, is the minimal difference between such a power and
outright ownership.
4. Resulting Trusts. Those resulting trusts which arise
upon the failure of express family trusts should be analyzed in
the same way as defeasibly vested reversions: they simply would
not violate the Rule. But how would the failure of charitable
trusts operate under the reformulated structure? If cy pres cannot be utilized, there are said to be resulting trusts, 116 but these interests, now characterized as contingent future interests rather
than as vested reversions or possibilities of reverter, would be
invalid. Since the reformulated structure continues to afford a
basis for differentiating such interests, one solution would be to
provide by statute that they are not subject to the Rule. In

favor of this solution is that it would be illogical to make such
resulting trusts invalid since they are created by operation of
law."7 Another solution would be to broaden the cy pres power

by legislation to the effect that the benefit of such trusts could
always be redirected for some other charitable purpose when there
is a violation of either the Rule or a period-in-gross statute.118
This solution is appealing because of its similarity to the result
under the reformulated structure when a possibility of reverter
or right of entry arising out of a nontrust charitable transfer
violates the Rule or a period in gross statute. The analogy is
stronger when the charitable transfer in trust takes the shape of
a defeasible possessory interest, containing words of limitation or
condition subsequent. The broadened cy pres power would, however, also apply to those transfers which simply contain language
restricting the purpose for which the trust property can be used.

116 E.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (I970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS ? 4I3 (I959).

117 This is one claimed rationale for their present exemption from the Rule.
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ? 454, at 519 (2d ed. I964). The exemption of
resulting trusts in real property from the Statute of Frauds is predicated on a
similar theory. Id. ? 452.

118 Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, ? 301.IO (I950); Schuyler, supra note 46, at
942-43; Schuyler, Future Interests in Illinois: Current Maturities and Some Futures, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 457, 5I3-2I (I955).
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V. CONCLUSION
A reformulation of the structure of estates of the magnitude
proposed here can be accomplished only by legislative action, and

an assemblage of provisions that might be used as the nucleus of
a statute fulfilling this objective has been inserted in the Appendix. The provisions in the appendix are not intended to comprise
a complete piece of legislation and do not treat matters peripheral

to the central thrust of the reformulated structure. No specific
resolution is offered, for example, as to whether commercial and

charitable possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are to be

exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities and subject instead to
a period in gross restriction. Nor are specific provisions offered to
abolish the inalienability rule, the destructibility rule, the Rule
in Shelley's Case, and the worthier title doctrine. Model provi-

sions for these purposes are plentiful."9 If, however, these rules
were abolished, as they should be, the sole legal consequence which
would flow from an interest's being classified as contingent is that
it would be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Finally, no

attempt is made here to settle the problem of which provisions
should be retrospective.
Reformulating the structure will not eliminate all the complexity in the law of future interests. But the reformulation of
the structure outlined here would reduce the complexity in this
area of the law and would give to the structure of estates a degree
of conceptual integrity now badly lacking.

APPENDIX

Section-. Classification of Interests in Property as to Time of Enjoyment.
Legal and equitable interests in real and personal property are classified as to
time of enjoyment as:
(A) Possessory interests, which entitle the owner to the present possession or
enjoyment of the benefits of the property; or
(B) Future interests, which do not entitle the owner to possession or enjoyment of the benefits of the property until a future time.

Section-. Classification of Possessory Interests. -Possessory interests are classified as:
(A) Interests in fee simple absolute;
(B) Defeasible interests, which are interests which terminate upon the happen-

ing of an uncertain event, regardless of the language used to describe the uncertain event;

(C) Life interests;

(D) Interests for years, which are interests the duration of which is described
in units of a year or multiples or divisions thereof;

119 E.g., UNIFORM PROPERTY AcT ?? 7, I2, I4, i6 (1938).
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(E) Periodic interests, which will continue for successive periods of a year, or
successive periods of a fraction of a year, unless terminated;
(F) Interests at will, which are terminable at the will of either the transferor
or the transferee and have no designated period of duration.
Section-. Classification of Future Interests.-All future interests, whether left

in or created in the transferor or created in a transferee, including those interests
known at common law as "reversions," "resulting trusts," "possibilities of reverter,"
"rights of entry" ("powers of termination"), "executory interests," and "remainders," are assimilated under the title "future interest."
(A) "Future interests" are classified as:
(i) "Contingent," if the interest is in favor of one or more unascertained

or unborn persons, or is for any reason uncertain to become possessory at some
future time; or

(2) "Vested subject to open," if the interest is in favor of a class of persons, one or more of whom are ascertained and in being, and if the interest is

certain to become a possessory interest at some future time, and the share of the

ascertained persons is subject to diminution by reason of other persons' becoming
entitled to share as members of the class; or

(3) "Indefeasibly vested," if the interest is not vested subject to open or
contingent.

(B) The classification known at common law as "vested subject to complete
defeasance" is abolished. Future interests which would at common law have been
so classified are either "indefeasibly vested" or "contingent."

(C) Language which expressly confers on the transferor the right to reenter
and take possession of the premises or words of similar import may be construed
as a power of revocation or a power of appointment rather than a future interest.

Section-. Application of the Rule Against Perpetuities. -The Rule Against
Perpetuities shall apply to all contingent future interests [except as specified in
Section -].

Section-. No Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Certain Cases. Subject to the doctrine of infectious invalidity, no future interest shall violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities if it is contingent only because another future interest
which has priority may take effect in possession instead, or because a power might

be exercised creating in the appointee an interest which takes effect in possession
instead, and the other future interest or the power violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
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